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COMMENTS
Software Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of
the Notion of Intangibility

.

The computer industry originally marketed hardware1 and
software2 components in mutually-dependent units through its
hardware manufacturers. In 1969 IBM announced that it would
no longer "bundle" hardware and software, an action that led to
the formation of the independent software manufacturing industry? As the industry began to market software on an indepen1. Hardware includes the central processing unit and "peripherals," i.e., printers,
card readers, tape drives, disk storage devices, and telecommunication switching devices.
2. In trade parlance software is generally the set of machine-readable programs that
cause hardware to perform predetermined tasks. Programs may be "systems" programs,
which control the internal operations of the central processing unit and the peripherals
when commanded by "applications" programs or other systems programs. "Applications"
programs interact with the user on a higher level; these programs perform functions such
as payroll, billing, or scientific work. For a criticism of the emphasis the legal community
has placed upon the systems/applications dichotomy, see note 22 infra.
Software does not include program listings that describe the high-level algorithm of
the program in a programming "language." Software also does not include documentation, manuals, or any service.
Technically speaking, software requires physical space for storage and may be represented by electrical pulses in temporary storage or magnetic pulses similar to a sound
recording in more permanent storage. Older technological applications represent
software by a particular combination of punched holes in paper tape or cards. These
representations are read by mechanical processes similar to that of a phonograph needle
reading disk depressions. See generally Briefs Amici Curiae, Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S.
219 (1976).
April 14, 1980,
3. Goetz, Unbundling: Will 80's Repeat the 60's?, COMPUTERWORLD,
at 33. A computer vendor who "bundled" provided software and services with the hardware "free of charge." A vendee was forced to rely totally upon the selected hardware
vendor's complementary packages. Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, COMPUTERWORLD,
Dec. 31, 1979/Jan. 7, 1980, at 35.
This hardware/software disunification radically changed the marketing practices of
software manufacturers. Early programs were written for an end user on a one-to-one
M., BERNSTEIN,
R. DICKSON,
JR., N. FRANCE,
B. ROSENBLATT,
D. SMITH
basis. T. D O L ~ A
& T. STEEL,JR., DATA
PROCESSING
IN 1980-1985 (1976). The distinctions between product
and service, vendor and vendee were often justifiably blurred. Today the software manufacturer is a marketplace sophisticate whose ultimate economic stratagem is to distribute
en masse commercial software-that is, in "off-the-shelf" packages for unknown
users-to effectively compete with the declining unit costs of hardware technology. For a
discussion of commercial software, see Frank, Commercial Software, COMPUTERWORLD,
Dec. 31, 1979lJan. 7, 1980, at 18.
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dent basis, the need arose for judicial arbitration of problems
inherent in software ownership and sales.
Because software has been difficult to visualize and conceptualize,' it has been difficult to define. Courts and other concerned governmental entities, forced to categorize software as either tangible or intangible for tax and other purposes, have
reached inconsistent conclusions.
This Comment suggests that software is technologically tangible and that legal recognition of software tangibility is the
most effective way to eliminate the inconsistent treatment
software has received in federal and state tax decisions and from
the Internal Revenue Service. If adopted, this approach would
require the abandonment of precedent developed at a time when
the character of software was not properly understood by tax
authorities. This approach would, however, equalize the legal
benefits and burdens that are now distributed on an unprincipled basis among manufacturers within and without the
software industry. The net effect would be to place the software
manufacturer in a legal posture similar to that of manufacturers
of technologically analogous products.

State courts with tax jurisdiction and the Internal Revenue
Service (Service) have generally characterized software as intangible. At the state and local levels, this characterization exempts
software from sales,' use: and personal property taxes: which
4. All software goes through various stages of development. A brief examination of
these stages may illustrate some of the reasons for definitional problems:
(1) A systems analyst defines the needs of the user (current manual methods
are examined).
(2) The analyst details a description of the proposed computerized processes.
(3) The analyst or programmer outlines the proposed processes in a general
computer program format (a flowchart may be drawn).
(4) The programmer translates the general program steps into a high-level language such as FORTRAN or COBOL. When this translation is keypunched or
typed, it becomes machine readable "source" code. The code resides on magnetic disk, magnetic tape, or cards.
(5) The central processing unit translates this code through the use of another
piece of software-the compiler-into "object" code which more closely corresponds with the machine's architecture for efficient processing. This object
code is also stored and after extensive testing becomes the salable product.
See generally NATIONAL
COMMISSION
ON NEWTECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS,FINALREPORT(1979). ,
5. A sales tax is an impost on the consumption of commodities, assessed upon transactions within the jurisdiction. Although the concept of a sales tax is rather broad, it
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turn on product or asset tangibility.' At the federal level, on the
other hand, the characterization causes software owners to lose
investment tax credit benefits and depreciation allowances normally available for tangible assets.

A. State and Local Characterizations
Most state and local revenue departments which have considered the issue have assumed that software is a tangible product or asset? When taxpayers have brought challenges, however,
state courts have usually ruled to the contrary.1° These courts
have characterized software as intangible and exempt from sales,
use, and ad valorem personal property taxes.
may be said that the element common to sales taxes is computation of the tax upon the
gross amount involved in the sale of goods or other transaction upon which the tax is
based. 68 AM. JUR. 2~ Sales and Use Taxes 5 1 (1973).
6. A use or compensating tax imposes a levy upon the use in the state of property
purchased outside the state. It is substantially complementary to the sales tax of particular jurisdictions and is designed to discourage the loss of business within the jurisdiction
because of the imposition of a local sales tax. Id. 5 171.
7. Personal property taxes may extend to both tangibles and intangibles. The various forms of statutory assessments against intangibles are, however, different from other
forms of taxation. 84 C.J.S. Taxation 5 78 (1954). Because local tax authorities have
experienced some trouble in locating and taxing intangibles, a statutory provision or a
"tacit policy of exclu[sion]" may totally or partially exempt intangibles from general personal property taxes. See Bryant & Mather, Property Taxation of Computer Software,
18 N.Y.L.F. 59, 67-68 (1972); Note, The Revolt Against the Property Tax on Software:
L. REV.118, 125 n.28
An Unnecessary Conflict Growing Out of Unbundling, 9 SUFFOLK
(1974).
8. The Arizona statutory requirement of tangibility is typical:
15. "Sale" includes any transfer of title or possession, or both, exchange, barter, lease or rental, conditional or otherwise, in any manner or by any means
whatever, of tangible personal property, for a consideration . . . .

....

17. "Tangible personal property" means personal property which may be seen,
weighed, measured, felt, touched or is in any other manner perceptible to the
senses.
ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN. 5 42-1301 (Supp. 1979).
app. 2-3.2c, 2-3.2d (re9. See generally [I9791 2 COMPUTERL. SEW. (BIGELOW)
sponses to a recent survey of state revenue departments).
10. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir.
1972); State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977); Honeywell
Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1978);
County of Sacramento v. Assessment Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 654, 671, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 434,446 (1973); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals,
L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW)
486 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing
(19801 7 COMPUTER
Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
L. SEW. REP.(BIGELOW)
18 (Fla. Div. Admin.
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
481
Hearings 1976); Puritan Life Ins. Co., [I9801 7 COMPUTER
(R.I. Tax Div. 1979); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976);
First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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The first major state decision to consider the issue, District
of Columbia v. Universal Computer Associates, Inc.,ll became
an often cited precedent. In this 1972 decision the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit determined that the software portion of a "bundled"12 system constituted an intangible product exempt from the local sales tax. The
court reasoned that software's tangible transporting mediumlS
was "insignificant" to the transaction, the true object being intangible "knowledge" that "rest[ed] in the machine." After delivery, the medium upon which the "knowledge" was carried
could be destroyed, stored, or returned.14 Later decisions have
relied upon Universal as highly persuasive, if not controlling,
authority for the proposition that state and local tax agencies
have wrongfully attempted to tax an intangible asset or good.16
Other decisions have characterized software as an intangible
for a variety of additional reasons. Unable to separate a list of
purchased contract items into software and non-software categories, one court labeled them all as software and, because of the
tax authority's inclusion of intangible components, characterized
the entire bundle as an intangible? Because a revenue authority
attempted to tax only software transmitted on a tangible meanother court condium rather than by telecomm~nication,~~
strued this to be an admission by the tax authority that the true
object of the transaction was an intangible." If alternative
modes of transmission are available to the vendor, the courts
have assumed that the object of the transaction is intrinsically
11. 465 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
12. For a definition of "bundling," see note 3 supra.
13. The medium in this case was punched cards. 465 F.2d at 617. Software media
also include punched paper tape, magnetic tape, magnetic disk or electronic memory
("core") itself.
14. Id. a t 618.
15. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ma. 1977); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 575 P.2d 801 (Ct. App.
1978); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER L. SERV.REP.(BIGELOW)
486 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975);Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v.
L. SEW.REP. (BIGELOW)
18 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976);
Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of
Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
16. Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7
L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW)
486, 489, 491-92 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975).
COMPUTER
17. Computer programs and data may be communicated over microwave or teleDISTRIBUTED
PROCBSSING
AND
phone lines. For a technical discussion, see D. MCGLYNN,
DATACOMMUNICATIONS
(1978).
18. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tern. 1976).
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intangible.la Finally, where courts have been unable to fully resolve the basic issue of subject matter tangibility, they have typically rendered pro-taxpayer decisions on the ground of
ambiguity.20
This characterization of software as intangible has met,
however, with isolated but vigorous exception and dissent. In
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Department of Assessments & Ta~ation,~l
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the
state's highest court, separated from the tax authority's broad
categorization of software those elements constituting actual
machine software-systems programs.22 These programs were
firmly characterized as tangible for property tax purposes.2s In
~*
Justice
State v. Central Computer Services, I ~ C . , Alabama
Maddox contended in dissent that the majority's characterization of software as intangible had failed to properly deal with a
related film industry decision.s6 He further implied that the majority's reasoning was based on an obsolete approach not applicable to "computer age" techno10gy.~~
19. See cases cited note 79 infra.
20. See cases cited note 95 infra.
21. 271 Md. 674, 320 A.2d 52 (1974).
22. Id. at 678-79, 320 A.2d a t 55. The technical distinction between "systems programs" and "applications programs" is disappearing. Although hardware cannot operate
without a systems program, systems programs often lose strict machine dependency;
they may be designed to emulate another machine's characteristics by running the emulated machine's operating systema. For a technical example, see Bhandenkar & RothFeb. 1979, at 159.
man, The Vax-11, DECDs32-Bit Version of the PDP-11, DATAMATION,
The industry sees little practical distinction in its marketing practices. IBM's unbundling move also significantly affected the independent systems software manufacturing industry. The supposed closer ties to the hardware were of no significance to the
marketing practices of compatible systems software. See generally Engle, Overview of
Sept. 17, 1980, at 65.
Systems and Utility Packages, COMPUTERWORLD,
In the past, some have attached significance to systems software, considering it to be
inextricably connected with the hardware and therefore entitled to treatment as a tangible, whereas applications software may not be so entitled. See generally Note, The Revolt Against the Property Tax on Software, supra note 7. The California statutory
scheme taxes only systems programs and exempts the rest. CAL.REV. & TAXCODE$3
995, 995.1, 995.2 (West Supp. 1980).
23. 271 Md. a t 680,320 A.2d at 56. The court, however, cited Universal, 465 F.2d at
615, and County of Sacramento, 32 Cal. App. 3d at 654, 108 Cal. Rptr. a t 434, both of
which had characterized software as an intangible. The court made no attempt to distinguish these former decisions. 271 Md. a t 680, 320 A.2d at 56.
24. 349 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1977).
25. Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282 So. 2d 892 (1973),
cited in State v. Central Computer Servs., 349 So. 2d at 1162, 1163 (Ala. 1977).
26. State v. Central Computer Serva., 349 So. 2d at 1164.
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B. Federal Characterizations
In response to confusion among its agents,"' the Service
promulgated Revenue Procedure 69-21?' in which unbundled
software is specifically characterized as an intangible asset?
Bundled software, however, receives distinctly different treatment. Without actually labeling bundled software a tangible asset, Procedure 69-21 effectively permits it to be treated as tangible by allowing the taxpayer to include software acquisition
costs with those of the associated hardware?O Because the Service considers unbundled software intangible, it is therefore ineligible for an investment tax credit under section 38 of the Internal Revenue Code.s1 Therefore, in order to receive the benefits
of the investment tax credit, a vendee must purchase software
from one of the decreasing number of vendors who still bundle.
Moreover, under Revenue Procedure 69-21, the software owner
is precluded from selecting the advantageous depreciation methods and schedules normally extended to owners of tangible
product^.^' To recover costs the software buyer must limit his
depreciation to that defined in Revenue Procedure 69-21. The
cash flow implications of this procedure can be staggering."

The characterization of software as intangible for tax purposes is inconsistent with the general legal and technical definitions of product tangibility. Specifically, it is inconsistent with
state and federal tax court characterizations of analogous products, state court characterizations in software contract disputes,
and pervasive trade usage.
27. See generally Bigelow, Federal Software Taxation, [I9791 1 COMPUTER
L. SERV.
(BIGELOW)
5 2-3.2, Art. 1, at 2, 5 (1972).
28. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303.
29. Id. $ 4.
30. Id.
Where such costa are included, without being separately stated, in the cost
of the hardware (computer) and such costs are treated as a part of the cost of
the hardware that is capitalized and depreciated [the service will not disturb
the taxpayer's treatment of such costs] . . . .
Id.
31. "Section 38 property" does not include intangibles. I.R.C. 5 48(a)(l).
32. See Bigelow, supra note 27, at 6-8.
33. Id. at 2-6.
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1. Machine-Coded Data

Machine-coded data is physically equivalent to computer
software. Both "products" may be represented binarily by either
electronic, magnetic, or physical pulses in core, on magnetic disk
or tape, or on paper card or tape. Both may be transmitted via
telecommunications equipment. Both may be read by the same
hardware mechanism. Just as one machine's software may be
another machine's data, one machine's data may be another
machine's s o f t ~ a r e . The
~
products, then, are technically
indisting~ishable.~~
Despite these similarities, the state and federal courts have
often characterized machine-coded data as a tangible product or
asset. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit, in Texas Instruments, Inc.
u. United States,a6allowed the taxpayer to apply investment tax
credit benefits to data acquisition costs. The court rejected the
Service's contention that the tangible medium was merely incidental to the intangible information contained thereon: "The
government's arguments, plausible as they may sound, simply
refuse to recognize that the value of the . . . data is entirely dependent upon the existence of the tapes. . .
State courts are split in their characterizations of machine
coded data. The Ohio Supreme Court has characterized machine
34. For example, one machine may use a previously constructed software program to
build a second similar program for a different machine which would require different
software characteristics (the second machine may require different input-output configurations or different addressing conventions). The first machine would "read" the original
program in much the same way as it would read a "text" data file, searching for specific
textual combinations and reacting in a predetermined manner while building the second
program. The first machine's output, then, is mere output data that results from the
machine's operation. However, to the aecond machine, this is not mere output data. The
"data" may now act as a software program, performing the same functions as the original
program designed for another machine.
35. In fact, the outcome of a machine-coded data case may influence the actions of a
revenue department in assessing software. In Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341, 267 N.W.2d 656 (1978), the court held this type of
product to be intangible and non-taxable, leading to a memorandum from the Wisconsin
Department of Revenue suggesting broader impact in the data processing industry.
[I9791 2 COMPUTER
L. SERV.
(BIGELOW)
app. 2-3.2d, at Wis. p. 20.
36. 551 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 611. Geophysical Service, Inc., a subsidiary of Texas Instruments, collected impulses resulting from seismic soundings. These impulses were refined and edited by compuer and transcribed on the disputed tapes. The digital data in the tapes was
used to produce a non-digital, analog picture of the soundings. Id. at 608.
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coded data as tangible for tax purposes.88 The Wisconsin and
Texas supreme courts, however, have characterized data as intangible and exempt from state taxation, rendering pro-taxpayer
decisions on the ground of a m b i g ~ i t y . ~ ~
2. Film and Videotape Products

Film and videotape products are physically similar to the
computer software product. AU three may be wholly or partially
represented by magnetic pulses on magnetic tape or disk. All require hardware to extract information contained on the medi~m.~O
All have value far above the cost of the transferring medium; all may be transmitted by telecommunications equipment;
and finally, all may be physically imitated by "actors" or "programmers" duplicating the work?
The Service originally treated motion picture film and
videotape products, like software, as intangible. The Ninth Circuit, however, has rejected the Service's position and has characterized motion picture and videotape film products as tangible
property for investment credit purposes." The first major decision, Walt Disney Productions v. United States," overturned
Treasury Regulation 1.48-l(f), which had characterized the film
product as an intangible asset. In the regulation the Service reasoned that because the production of film involved such intangibles as manuscript costs, screenplay costs, and wardrobe
design costs, the final product should be evaluated for tax purposes as an intangible." The Walt Disney cpurt criticized the
Service's argument, commenting that an automobile production
machine should therefore be largely intangible because many of
its costs may be traced to invention, engineering, and labor
38. Accountant's Computer Servs., Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 132-33, 298
N.E.2d 519, 527-28 (1973).
39. See Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Tex. 1977);
Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341,345-46, 267
N.W.2d 656, 658 (1978).
40. State v. Central Computer Servs., 349 So. 2d 1160,1165 (Ala. 1977) (Maddox, J.,
dissenting).
41. Id.
42. See Bing Crosby Prods. v. United States, 588 F.2d 1293, 1297-99 (9th Cir. 1979);
Walt Disney Prods. v. United States, 549 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1976); Walt Disney
Prods. v. United States, 480 F.2d 66,68 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974).
Cf. District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (sales
tax case).
43. 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 934 (1974).
44. Id. a t 67, 68.
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expenditure^.^^

The state courts have also concluded that film products are
tangible property. Although most of a film product's value lies in
its intangible copyright46or intangible production servicest7 the
courts have reasoned that the vendee desires a finished produ ~ tTherefore,
. ~ ~
the courts have declared that the film product,
despite its intangible elements, is tangible and subject to sales or
personal property taxes.4a

B. Software Contract Disputes
Those courts that have handled software contract disputes
have either expressly or impliedly brought software sales within
the purview of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)?O Although these courts were not required to classify software products as tangible in order to bring them within the UCC, they
were obliged to apply to software products the "goods" label as
defined within the UCC. The UCC defines goods to mean "all
things . . . movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale."s1 Furthermore, "[gloods must be both existing and
--

45. Id. at 68.
46. Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 689-94, 371 P.2d
340, 343-45, 21 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605-08 (1962).
47. District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746, 747 (D.C. Cir.
1964).
48. Id. at 747.
49. E.g., District of Columbia v. Nomood Studios, Inc., 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Michael Todd Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 684, 371 P.2d 340,21 Cal.
Rptr. 604 (1962). See also Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 291 Ala. 490, 282
So. 2d 892 (1973) (levy assessment against film lease); Crescent Amusement Co. v. Carson, 187 Tenn. 112, 213 S.W.2d 27 (1948) (levy assessment against film lease).
In University Microfilms v. Scio Township, 76 Mich. App. 616, 257 N.W.2d 265
(1977), the taxpayer sought to escape state taxation of his film product. The court chose
not to apply a taxpayer's argument that film was similar to software and therefore intangible. Id. a t 618, 257 N.W.2d a t 267.
There has been recent, although limited, exception to this film tangibility rule. Although the court in Simplicity Pattern Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 Cal. App. 3d
184, 161 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1980), characterized film as an intangible product, it based its
reasoning on a statute exempting master sound tapes and records. The court construed
this statute, although not controlling in the case, to be a "clear indication of legislative
thinking." Id. at 188, 161 Cal. Rptr. a t 561.
50. Chatlos Syss., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
1979); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
reu'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs
Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a f d , 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974); Burroughs
Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
51. U.C.C. 8 2-105(1).
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identified before any interest in them can pass."52 It is inconsistent to label an item as both intangible and a "good."5s
Software may also be considered tangible for purposes of replevin. In F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp. (EDS)," EDS delivered software to Schaefer. When
Schaefer breached the payment terms, EDS filed a motion for
replevin. The United States Court for the Southern District of
New York held that EDS had made out a prima facie case for
replevin.55 Schaefer's contention that programs were intangible
and not subject to replevin was unpersuasive." The court had
little difficulty in calling the disputed software "quite
tangible."57

C. Industrial Usage and Technological Definitions
The software industry has characterized itself as a manufacturer of tangible products rather than as a mere purveyor of intangible knowledge or services. In patent cases before the Supreme Court," for example, software manufacturers have urged
through briefs of amici curiae that the Court view software as an
apparatus or machine." These software manufacturers have
strictly limited software to the completely debugged and tested
machine programPo rather than extending the definition to include the broad categorization of such items as programs, listings, consulting services, and debugging services, which the early
-

-

52. Id. 8 2-105(2).
53. See Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77 MICH.L. REV.
1149, 1150, 1151 n.11 (1980). In Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F.
Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979), the
court labeled the furnishing of custom designed software as goods under the purview of
the U.C.C., but, after citing F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Syss. Corp., 430 F.
Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'dmem., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979), the court inexplicably adopted the fiction that software, although within the definition of U.C.C. "goods," is
an intangible.
54. 430 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), a f d mern., 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
55. Id. at 989.
56. Id. a t 991.
57. Id. at 992.
58. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); D a m v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 US. 63 (1972). For a recent commentary, see Gemignani, Le& TECH.269 (1980).
gal Protection for Computer Software, 7 RUTCERSJ. COMPUTERS
59. Brief Amicus Curiae for Universal Software, Inc. at 10, 22, Dam v. Johnston,
425 U.S. 219 (1976); Brief Amicus Curiae for Software Associates, Inc., at 13; Brief Amicus Curiae for The Association of Data Processing Services Organizations, Software Industry Association (ADAPSOISIA) a t 20.
60. E.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for Universal Software, Inc. at 10.
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software courts had difficulty labeling as tangible software. They
have further declared that software alters the machine
"semipermanently" causing the hardware to perform as a "new
machine."61
Trade publications refer to software as a product, its makers
as manufacturers, and8 its designers as engineer^.^^ Large
software houses subject their products to a rigorous quality assurance analysis, evaluating function, size, performance, reliability, flexibility, maintainability, and portability."
Although the definitions vary between legal advocates of
patenting and those seeking tax exemptions, industry experts do
not consider software to be formless, incorporeal "knowledge"
resting within the hardware. They see it as a machine component, more analogous to electronic circuitry than to the printed
program listing on an eye-readable document?

The erroneous characterization of software in state tax decis i o n ~stems
~ ~ from a general application of reasoning that is
technologically inaccurate, from a misapplication of sound pre61. Brief Amicus Curiae for Software Associates, Inc. .at 6, 11. "The technical reality
is that program software causes new circuits to be formed in the general purpose machine, thereby changing it to a special purpose machine or an enhancedlextended general purpose machine." Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
62. D. MCGLYNN,
supra note 17, at 258; M. Goetz, "The 'What is Software' Legal
Snafu," at 3-4 (June 6, 1978) (unpublished paper presented at the National Computer
Conference, Anaheim, California, by Martin A. Goetz, Senior Vice President of Applied
Data Research, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey).
Jan. 1979, at 131.
63. Patrick, Things are Looking U p for Software, DATAMATION,
64. Goetz, supra note 62, at 3; Myers, What is Software?, DATAMATION,
Mar. 1979,
at 74.
65. In a federal tax decision, the Tax Court of the United States in Computer Sciences Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 327 (1974), characterized software as an intangible
asset for section 341 (collapsible corporations) purposes. Section 341 of the Internal Revenue Code requires for its application "the manufacture, construction, or production of
property." The taxpayer argued that software was, in fact, not "property" at all, but
"know-how" and "goodwill," and therefore not within the ambit of "property" in section
341.63 T.C. at 343. The taxpayer's corporation was held not to be collapsible. Id. at 354.
The court, however, conceded the taxpayer's argument that software was "intangible"
but maintained that it was section 341 "property." Id. at 344. This conclusion was necessary for the court to address the issue upon which the case actually turned: the required
intent to sell the corporation had not been formed before the required production of
"property" had been completed. Id. at 354. The characterization of software as "property" was critical; its characterization as an intangible was not critical and was little
more than an assumption.
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cedent, and from a policy of deference to the taxpayer where the
tax law is ambiguous.
A. Insufficient Information and Technological Inaccuracies
Insdcient technical information and technological inaccuracies have served as the bases for poor precedent. Although
many of the issues of tangibility confronting software litigants
have surfaced in the machine-coded data and film industry tax
disputes, the software tax courts have chosen to characterize
software as an intangible asset and product. Several distinct reasons exist for this characterization.
I . Insufficient Technical Input
'

Courts have had difficulty rendering judgments in light of
insufficient technical information. Tax authorities at times have
been unable to articulate accurate definitions of software. Some
tax authorities have insisted upon bringing obvious intangibles
within a definition of software. In addition to computer programs, they have included design and analysis, planning, preparation of feasibility studies, debugging and testing, educational
training and instructions, educational publications, tests, measurements, adjustments, repairs, and conversion a n a l y s i ~ .If~
not limited solely to machine-executable, marketable programs,
this cumbersome categorization becomes most "trouble~ome"~~
to the courts and they become "relu~tan[t]"~~
to allow the state's
broad taxation.
2. The "Intrinsic Intangibility" Assumption

The courts have generally assumed that software is intrinsically incorporeal and that it is mere intangible "knowledge"
which "rests in the r n a ~ h i n e . 'This
~ ~ technologically inaccurate
66. See Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 180
n.1, 575 P.2d 801,810 n.1 (Ct. App. 1978); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of
Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
486, 489 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. 1975); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271
Md. 674,678,320 A.2d 52,55 (1974). See also Annot., 82 A.L.R.3d 597,599 (1978) (summary of state's brief in Greyhound).
67. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md.
674, 677, 320 A.2d 52, 54 (1974).
68. Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7
L. SERV.
REP. (BIGELOW)
486, 489 n.* (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975).
COMPUTER
69. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assoc., Inc., 465 F.2d 615,618 (D.C.
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portrayal of software arises from the Universal opinion and has
been quoted or paraphrased with approval in other decisions?O
These courts have premised this assumption on a simple but improper basis. Because the tape, disk, card, or other transferring
medium may be stored, returned, or destroyed7' after being used
by the vendee machine, the Universal court reasoned that the
visible manifestation of software-the medium-is inconsequenTherefore, the court assumed, the obtial to the transa~tion.~~
ject of the transaction must be intangible "knowledge" because
the medium is inconsequentialTsThe Universal court, however,
failed to establish the connection between this assumption of
product intangibility and the observation of medium inconsequentiality. Other notable decisionsT4have not questioned or
qualified this reasoning and have not attempted to establish the
critical connection.
The technician would find this reasoning particularly difficult to comprehend, knowing that software actually has physical
properties of mass and volume. Software, defined as the machine-readable end-product of program design," must possess
physical properties to enable the host hardware unit to act in a
predetermined manner. Although industry experts question the
Cir. 1972).
70. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977);
Honeywell Information Sysa., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP.(BIGELOW)
486, 491 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v.
Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
18, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings
1976); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976).
71. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 618
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160,1162 (Ala. 1977); HoneyL. SERV.
well Information Syss., Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER
REP.(BIGELOW)
486, 491 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975); Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew,
[I9801 6 COMPUTER
L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW)
18, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976);
Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tenn. 1976).
75. Brief Amicus Curiae for Universal Software, Inc. at 10, Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219 (1976), states:
Amicus CBEMA's basic misapprehension of the commercial realities of program machine design and implementation would lead one to confuse a flowcharted and coded finRnciai banking procedure with an effective procedure in
the form of a completely debugged and tested program. Only the latter, i.e. the
running program, is a commodity which is merchantable . . . . Absent this
merchantable program machine, whether in the form of punched cards, magnetic tape or disks, the general purpoee digital computer is not capable of solving any problem.
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analogy, labeling it ~implistic:~software may be compared to a
paper roll in a player piano." When the mechanical devices in a
player piano encounter a physical aberration in the paper "music," a message is sent to alter the piano's existing state. Similarly, when the computer hardware experiences a magnetic, electronic, or physical aberration in the tape, core," or paper
medium, a message is sent to alter the computer's physical state.
If the tape copy of the software has been destroyed but the vendee continues to use the software, the vendee has certainly dedicated a specific amount of volume and mass on tape, disk, card,
or in core to store a copy of that software. This storage precludes the storage of any other data or software in the allotted
space. Similarly, the owner of a player piano may store his "music" on another roll and thereafter destroy the first. Destruction
of the purchased roll does not, however, render the "music"
intangible.
3. The "Alternative Transmission Mode" Rationale

The "alternative transmission mode" rationale, first applied
by the Universal court, resulted from a combination of judicial
and tax authority errors. This rationale, related to the intrinsic
intangibility assumption previously discussed, merely reflects a
conclusion that because a variety of software transfer methods
exist, the essence of the transaction must be some intangible or
the mere embodiment of services?@These methods include not
only visible media transfer by disk, tape, or card, but also direct
76. Id. at 5-6; Brief Amicus Curiae for Software Associates, Inc. at 11.
77. This analogy has been used often. A recent treatment may be found in First
Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1979) (Duniway,
J., dissenting). A bank acquired a computer program and attempted to recover costs by
deducting them as a business expense under I.R.C. 5 162(a). The Commissioner disallowed the deductions, arguing that the acquisition costs were for franchise rights and
therefore should have been capitalized accordingly. The court held in favor of the bank.
In dissent, Judge Duniway used the player piano analogy, not to define a tangiblelintangible distinction, but to define an expeminglcapitalization distinction. The analogy, although well phrased for the tangiblelintangible distinction, may not have been as apt in
the context in which it was used.
78. A program performs work only when a copy has been loaded into the central
processing unit hardware. Internal hardware circuitry then reacts in predetermined ways.
79. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc. 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977);
Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
18,
26, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); Puritan Life Ins. Co., [I9801 7 COMPUTER
L.
SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
481, 483,484(R.I. Tax Div. 1979); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock,
584 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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programmer input and telecommunication transfer. Because
software may also be transferred in the latter two ways, the
courts and the tax authorities have imprudently moved towards
intangibility, reasoning that the lack of a tangible medium in all
possible transfers demonstrates that the object of the transaction must be intangible.
Because it is possible to "bring" a program to a vendee
merely "in the mind" of a programmer, the courts have erroneously concluded that the essence of any software transaction is
truly a service.80Although this construction of software by direct
programmer input is not amenable to sales and use taxes, since
there is no sale of a tangible product, a tangible product is nonetheless created at the buyer's situs and should be subject to any
property, sales or use taxes should the product be thereafter retained or sold. This judicial error arises because of the courts'
failure to properly apply a traditional product/service analysis to
a technologically new product.
Possible input via telecommunications transmission also
stymied the courts; since no visual media had been employed in
the sale, the courts reasoned that no transfer of a tangible product had been effected.81 The tax authorities have contributed to
the problem by refusing to impose sales and use taxes upon the
telecommunications-transferred software, while at the same time
assessing the complaining taxpayer's visible-media transferred
software.82 This inconsistency may have been construed by the
courts to be an admission of the intangibility of the object of the
transaction.
A technologically sound argument has been made, however,
for the proposition that software transferred by telecommunications does indeed result in the transfer of a tangible product.
80. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977);
Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
18,
26, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d
405,407-08 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548,550
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
81. See State v. Central Computer Servs., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977);
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
18,
Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
26-27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d
405,407-08 (Tenn. 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v. Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548,550
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See also Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166,
167 (Tex. 1977) (characterizing machine-coded data as intangible).
82. Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn. 1976). See
also Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [I9801 6 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP. (BIGELOW)
18, 27 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings 1976).
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One writer, arguing for UCC protection of software transactions,
has extended the concept of the sale of tangible goods under the
UCC to that of telecommunication transfers of software, citing
case authority for analogous electricity sale^.^

B. Misapplication of Sound Authority
Software, as has been previously discussed, occasionally has
received the characterization of tangibility. Greyhound concluded that systems software, at the least, is tangible property.
Without specifically stating as much, the Service, with its bundling exception, permits the taxpayer to treat software as a tangible asset. Software courts have nonetheless overlooked or misapplied these characterizations and those of the film industry.
1. Inadequate Disposition of Film Industry Para1lels

The courts in the earliest and therefore most critical
software tax decisions were obliged to either follow or distinguish film industry authority. Unfortunately, they disposed of
that parallel authority summarily. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit distinguished Universal from the notable District of Columbia v. Norwood Studios, Inc. decision? which had been rendered by the same
court, simply on the ground that the Norwood Studios vendor
had retained no interest in the film product after the sale,
whereas the Universal vendor had restricted the use of one of
the furnished programs.86
Other courts have concluded that film industry decisions are
not applicable to software disputes, reasoning that the transfer
medium is critical to the film product but only incidental to the
software p r o d ~ c tJustice
.~
Maddox's dissent in State v. Central
Computer Services, Inc? questioned the logic of this rationale.
Because software may be transferred by telecommunications or
83. Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., supra note 53, at 1153
n.21 (citing Helvey v. Wabash County REMC,151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972);
Wivagg v. Duquesne Light Co., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 694 (1975)). See also Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 1060 (1973).
84. 336 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
85. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 618-19
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
86. State v. Central Computer Serva., Inc., 349 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1977); Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tenn. 1976).
87. 349 So. 2d 1160 ( A h 1977).
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direct programmer input, the majority had concluded that the
film industry decisions did not apply. Seeing little difference between the use of the medium by film makers and its use by
software manufacturers, Justice Maddox countered by observing
that the film product may also be transmitted by telecommunications and reproduced by actors.88
2. Improper Application of Revenue Procedure 69-21
The critical Universal decision misconstrued the Service's
partial tangibility rule when it characterized all software as intangible. Section 4 of Revenue Procedure 69-218@
allows the taxpayer to treat software as a tangible asset with the hardware if
originally bundled with the hardware. In Universal, the taxpayer
had purchased a bundled package from IBM.*O The Universal
court, however, inappropriately applied the procedure's evaluation of intangibility for unbundled, separately acquired software
purchases to Universal's bundled software purchases.@l The
court would not have reached this conclusion had it properly applied the parallel portion of Procedure 69-21 pertaining to bundled purchases of software.
3. Improper Application of Greyhound's Tangibility Rule

The Greyhound court, relying on somewhat vague reasoning, characterized systems software as tangible, and exempted as
intangible all other items the state sought to tax-systems engineering services, educational services, and maintenan~e.~
Subsequent courts, however, have apparently overlooked Greyhound's
distinction between tangible and intangible items and have cited
Greyhound as authority for an intangible characterization of all
software,@3
including systems software. This manifest inconsistency may be explained by the complexity of the subject matter
coupled with the Greyhound court's vagaries.
88. Id. at 1164, 1165.
89. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text supra.
90. District of Columbia v. Universal Computer Assocs., Inc., 465 F.2d 615, 617
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
91. Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303, 3 4.
92. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 271 Md.
674, 678, 320 A.2d 52, 55 (1974).
93. See Honeywell Information Syss., Inc. v. Maricopa County, 118 Ariz. 171, 173,
575 P.2d 801, 803 (Ct. App. 1978); Honeywell Information Syss., Inc., v. Board of Assessment Appeals, [I9801 7 COMPUTER
L. SEW. REP. (BIGELOW)
486 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1975).
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C. Deferential Rulings for the Taxpayer
Within the realm of tax law, a unique multijurisdictional
policy of deferential treatment of the taxpayer on the ground of
ambiguity has persisted for years." When relevant authority has
been unpersuasive or weak, the courts have generally rendered
pro-taxpayer decisions. This has contributed, however, to a firm
stare decisis rule of intangibility on the basis of ambiguity for
certain software decision^.@^

IV. A NEEDFOR CONSISTENT
TANGIBILITY
'

A. Consistency
Consistency is essential if equitable treatment of industry
participants is to be maintained. Current inconsistency unfairly
favors the software manufacturer over manufacturers of other
products and favors certain software manufacturers over other
software manufacturers within the industry.
1. Industry-External Inequities

The status quo inconsistency, preferred by some in the industry,.. is most inequitable between the software manufacturer
and the manufacturer of analogous products. Software manufacturers obtain or seek to obtain federal investment tax credits accruing to vendors of tangible products. However, in those states
where courta have ruled that software is intangible, software
manufacturers have successfully avoided the property, sales, and
use taxes borne by manufacturers of analogous products.
2. Industry-Internal Inequities

Because Revenue Procedure 69-21 permits a vendee to lump
bundled software costs with those of hardware but requires different treatment for unbundled acquisitions,@'
two specific
94. E.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151,153 (1917). See also 3 C. SANDS,STATUTES&
STATUTORY
CONSTRUCIION
5 66.01 (4th ed. 1972).
95. See Nova Computing Servs., Inc. v. Askew, [1980] 6 COMPUTER
L. SERV.REP.
(BIGELOW)
18, 28 (Fla.Div. Admin. Hearings 1976); First Nat'l Bank of Fort Worth v.
Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 5CS, 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). See also Bullock v. Statistical Tabulating Corp., 549 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. 1977) (characterizing machine-coded data as intangible); Janesville Data Center, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 84 Wis. 2d 341,
345-46, 267 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1978) (characterizing machine-coded data as intangible).
96. Myers, supra note 64, a t 75.
97. See notea 27-33 and accompanying text supra.
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problems arise from the resulting market distortion. First, a vendee of bundled software possesses a definite and perhaps sizeable tax advantage over a vendee of identical unbundled software.
Secondly, that tax advantage, economically transmitted to the
hardware vendor, induces the hardware vendor to withstand
market forces to unbundle, thereby hindering technological development of competitive software systems in the independent
software industry.

B. Tangibility
For technological purposes software is tangible. Not only
should the tangiblelintangible inconsistency within the law be
eliminated, the ultimate characterization should fall on the side
of tangibility for several reasons.
The preservation of a definition of software as being intangible would perpetuate a legal-technological paradox. Proper
recognition of software as being tangible is demanded by a system of laws that seeks to avoid fiction.
Moreover, a characterization of software as tangible would
permit state and local revenue agencies to tap a large source of
potential revenue. Exponential growth in the industry is inevitable; the software manufacturing industry grew from virtually
nothing in the 1960'ss8 to an estimated $70.7 billion in 1980, up
from $43.1 billion in 1976.=
Finally, a continued characterization of software as intangible by the Service imposes a burden upon the software manufacturer not borne by manufacturers and owners of tangible products. This burden stems not from inconsistencies of
characterization within the industry but from a characterization
of software as intangible by the Service; the burden may be remedied simply by a repeal of Revenue Procedure 69-21.
98. Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, supra note 3, a t 35.
99. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.584,587 n.7 (1978). Emerging innovations can do nothing but hasten the industry's growth. The increased availability of communications links
between computer systems will cause transactional costs associated with the creation and
sale of software products to plummet as vendors transfer those products to the vendee in
fractional seconds. Distributive processing systems, the computing industry's major focus
for the 1980's, will give remote users cheap access to massive central mainframe systems,
which in turn will place huge demands upon the development of corresponding software
capabilities. See generally H. KATZAN,
DISTRIBUTIVE
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS(1979); D.
MCGLYNN,
supra note 17; M. DERTOUZOS
& J. MOSES,THECOMPUTER
AGE (1979).

878

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I980

The solution is simple and does not necessitate special legislation; all that is required is a reasonable construction of existing revenue statutes. The proper introduction of trade usage
would encourage the courts to construe revenue statutes in a
reasonable manner. Such construction is preferable to a construction conditioned by an "a priori bias against the collectibility [of taxes in general]."loOBecause tax laws often extend
into technical fields, reference to scientific facts, trade meaning,
and commercial usage are all relevant to statutory construetion.lol The courts must often reevaluate technical common law
definitions when precise distinctions are impractical or technologically obsolete.loS
This characterization of software as intangible stems from a
variety of mistakes. Poor factual input and reasoning that is
technologically inaccurate have served as the bases for poor precedent. Prior authority, which may have been based on sound
technological reasoning or results, has been ignored or misapplied by later courts grasping for persuasive authority. Where
authority has been weak or the evidence ambiguous, courts have
rendered pro-taxpayer decisions.
A consistent treatment of software as tangible in all relevant
areas of the law is preferable to the only other alternatives: (1)
inconsistent treatment or (2) treatment as an intangible. Consistent treatment would equalize the legal benefits and burdens
within and without the software industry. It would place the
software manufacturer in a legal posture similar to that of the
manufacturers of technologically analogous products. Treatment
of software as a tangible would also reflect the nature of the
product ,as it is viewed by its manufacturers and users. New
legislation is not needed to insure consistent treatment which
would treat software as a tangible. All that is required is the
simple and reasonable construction of existing revenue statutes.

VI. CONCLUSION
State courts with tax jurisdiction and the Internal Revenue
Senrice have generally characterized software as an intangible
product and asset. This characterization exempts software from
100. 3 C. SANDS,
supra note 93,§ 66.02.
101. Id. 66.03.
102. Id.
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state and local sales, use, and personal property taxes, which
turn upon the issue of tangibility. The Service's characterization
largely denies federal investment credit benefits for the software
owner and precludes tangible capitalizaton and depreciation for
separately acquired software.
This characterization of software as intangible is inconsistent with state and federal tax court chpracterizations of analogous products, state court characterizations of software in contract disputes, and pervasive trade usage.
Robert D. Crockett

